Improving quality and safety of telephone based delivery of care: teaching telephone consultation skills

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High quality telephone based health care delivered by appropriately trained staff should be available to all

The opportunity to consult by telephone is now an integral part of any modern patient-centred healthcare system. The public values the option of training. This is unsurprising because, confidence, perceived vulnerability and, ever, still reluctant to provide this form of way health care is received. In the convenience, and more choice in the advantages of quicker access to care, greater consulting by telephone, citing advantages of telephone consultations: “During a telephone consultation the doctor cannot see, touch, examine, investigate, smell or, in the strictest terms, even hear the caller/patient” and then advises that: “telephone consultations when correctly conducted can be considered to be safe and acceptable practice”. Both the limitations and the advantages of telephone consultation are therefore apparent, but doctors and medical students are given little advice or training in how to conduct telephone consultations correctly or develop the requisite skills. Most other professional and commercial services, including health related nurse run telephone services, insist on training for those who develop telephone based services.

Training courses need to help clinicians build appropriate attitudes, skills, and knowledge and should include both generic and specialty specific modules. In addition to verbal cue sensitivity and more focused history taking, generic topics include training in the adequate documentation of telephone encounters and awareness of when telephone consultations are inappropriate (for example, where there are language difficulties or where there is a clear necessity for clinical examination or need for use of investigative facilities) and an appreciation of relevant medicolegal issues. Clear guidance is needed regarding the “substitution” of questions for examination such as asking the patient to measure her/his temperature, blood pressure, peak flow or blood glucose level; exploration of strategies for home management including self-monitoring; negotiation of a plan and assessment of its feasibility; follow up arrangements; and management of expectations for a home visit. In addition, medical managers need to be aware that planned telephone consultations must require availability of medical records, a confidential telephone line in a quiet area, and the resources to document the consultation and to communicate this to others such as the general practitioner and the patient. There must be opportunities for early face to face consultation if the need becomes apparent during the telephone consultation. Hospitals should also consider offering morning or evening “commuter” telephone clinics for patients in employment.

Each specialty must consider its specific telephone training needs. We anticipate that these may focus on issues such as “warning signs and cues” for various disorders, guiding patients in performing limited self-examination (for example, determining if a rash blanches or, for asthma, asking an adult patient to record his/her peak flow or the mother of a child with asthma to assess the pulse rate or respiratory rate) and prescription guidelines (for example, prescription of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs in acute low back pain). Professional bodies need to provide clinicians with evidence (or state the absence) of the effectiveness and safety of such interventions to allow clinicians to undertake an evidence linked assessment of the advantages and limitations of telephone consultations. Future versions of guidelines, such as the British Thoracic Society/Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (BTS/SIGN) asthma guidelines, might include key questions to be asked during a telephone consultation.

There is evidence that clinicians’ performance, confidence, and satisfaction with delivery of care by telephone can be improved by short educational programmes. As for teaching traditional consultation skills, simulated patients are the cornerstone of teaching programmes aimed at improving telephone consultation skills. Such training should become an integral part of the consultation skills programmes that now run throughout undergraduate, general practice, and specialist training. For established clinicians, training opportunities need to be offered as part of continuing professional development.

A number of studies have identified substantial variation in the quality of telephone consultations. Monitoring and assessing the organisation and quality of telephone consultations is essential, and this appraisal should extend to receptionists and other essential team members. Many of the quality indicators for telephone consultations can be adapted relatively easily from other organisations such as The Telephone Helplines Association, UK.

With over 90% of the UK population now having ready access to a telephone, and with an increasing array of services now available on the telephone, it is essential that mechanisms are developed to ensure that high quality telephone based health care delivered by appropriately trained staff is available to all. NHS Direct (and similar developments in a range of commercial
Open disclosure of medical errors

Open disclosure: the only approach to medical error

R Lamb

Open, honest, and timely disclosure should be the only approach to medical error

The open, honest, and timely disclosure of medical error to patients should be, as Americans say, a “no brainer”. It is ethically, morally, and professionally expected of clinicians. It is clearly the right thing for patients who frequently say that, when things go wrong with their health care, what they need most is disclosure, an apology, and information about what happened and how it can be prevented from happening again.

Clinical staff might feel that open disclosure is either too difficult to deliver or labour under the perception that, by doing this, they will increase the risk of litigation. But being honest with patients about errors and mistakes is the right thing for doctors, other clinical staff, and the hospital involved. Open and truthful discussion with the patient is the first stage in promoting and fostering an environment and culture that, through honest discussion, encourages the learning needed to improve systems and thus reduce medical error. Doctors and other clinical staff who are not used to such an approach to discussing errors will need support as such discussions are difficult. But once an error has been acknowledged, discussed, and acted upon, clinical teams can get on with their job of treating the sick.

This all sounds so obvious, particularly to a reporter like me who, during 25 years in journalism, has frequently interviewed patients who have suffered from the health care they have received. But, traditionally, the decision about whether or not to disclose information about an error when it has taken place has largely been left to individuals. Traditions die hard, and while many individual clinicians undoubtedly do deal with such matters openly and honestly, it is clear from public statements of many patients that, even in the 21st century, this does not happen often enough and it is not encouraged in a systematic, organisation-based way. Or, when it does happen, it may not be handled satisfactorily from the patient’s point of view.

Certainly, my experience has been that, when patients take their stories to the news media, most of their anger is about how they were treated after the adverse event rather than the event itself. Mostly (and there are exceptions), these people have already tried hard to resolve issues through local and official channels and feel that they are not getting anywhere. Going to the news media is an action of last resort, born of frustrated attempts to find out the truth.

In New Zealand in 1995 a patient referred to in a later inquiry as “patient A” was diagnosed and treated for cervical cancer. She discovered that four cervical smears before this had been reported as normal or inconclusive when, in fact, they showed evidence of cancer. Put simply, her cancer could have been diagnosed earlier and, if it had, her treatment may have been considerably less invasive and subsequent health problems avoided. Fearing that many other women may have been similarly affected, she wanted to find out why her cancer had been undiagnosed and tried to get official agencies to investigate. In 1999, believing that was getting nowhere, she felt that she had no option but to take to the court the by then retired pathologist responsible for the diagnostic error and the unnecessarily late diagnosis of her cervical cancer.

The matter then became public, finally hit the headlines, and set up a train of events that led to the 2001 Gisborne Cervical Screening Inquiry. The problems that were uncovered have led to wide ranging recommendations for improvements to the national cervical screening programme.

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www.qshc.com
The legal battle continued until October 2003 when “patient A” reached a settlement with both the retired pathologist and the Crown. But in an interview a few months before this the patient told me that she would not have pursued the matter for so long if it had been dealt with more openly. She said that her actions would have been quite different if, at the outset, there had been an apology and if officials had responded more quickly to her questions and her concerns about other women. Surprisingly, she was expressing these feelings to the Joint Health Care Commission in its latest annual report.14

In the United States, where large jury settlements have fuelled medicolegal fears, there are also some encouraging signs that the fear may be worse than the reality. While the hard data on whether disclosure does lower malpractice costs are still limited, there is one notable exception—namely, the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky where it has been shown that a proactive policy for full disclosure has clearly mitigated the financial repercussions when patients have been harmed.15

More anecdotally, other US hospitals that are actively pursuing such policies also report that it is not hurting them. Hospitals such as Minneapolis Children’s and Boston’s Dana-Farber Cancer Institute have had written disclosure policies for more than 2 years.15 16 In interviews last year their chief operating officers reported that, while it was too early to present claims data, they believed the policies were beneficial not only to staff and patients but also to the organisations themselves. Julie Morath, the Chief Operating Officer for Minneapolis Children’s Hospital, said that they initially thought they would have to sedate their lawyers. “They got very anxious about the implications [of a disclosure policy]. But we see it as our obligation, our values and standards, our promises to families. Our legal counsel provides counsel about the risks and limitations but ultimately the decision about how we behave is ours and our board did endorse this knowing that there were risks in what we were about to do.”

As we wait for further empirical evidence, such testimony surely provides some reassurance that the open, honest, and timely disclosure of medical errors to patients is indeed the right thing to do and should be the only approach to medical error. If we look back at the New Zealand cervical screening case, the comment by “patient A” certainly suggests that a more open response to the discovery of her underdiagnosed smears in 1993 and an early investigation into whether there were other cases would have allowed her and the retired doctor to move on with their lives much earlier; it would also have taken the sting out of the publicity and avoided many of the headlines which have chronicled the difficult legal battles, the inquiry, and continuing fallout from the case. Of course the error would have made the news, but it would not have continued to make headlines for 4 years. It is more difficult to think up sensational headlines when the underlying story is essentially “error discovered: inquiry launched immediately” rather than “No action despite six looks at doctor” or “Warnings went on for years” and “Review confirms what battling patient knew” —headlines which appeared 4 years after patient A discovered her misread cervical smears.16


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All change

Quality and safety in health care: plus ça change, plus ça ne reste plus la même chose

F Moss

In the 12 years since QSHC was launched as QHC (Quality in Healthcare) attitudes to quality improvement have changed enormously. Then, in the United Kingdom, quality improvement work largely consisted of medical audit. Results of audit work were usually discussed in clinical meetings with little management involvement. There was a corporate responsibility—shared between clinicians and managers—for the quality of care, quality improvement, and risk management. The links between improvement in clinical practice and organisational change are widely acknowledged. Quality improvement is less an optional extra, it is more a part of routine practice. And much more is known about the extent of error than 12 years ago. Shocking revelations from public inquiries into the circumstances of scandals have illustrated the frailty of many parts of care systems. Data quantifying the extent of adverse events within many healthcare systems indicate that error is endemic. And, although health systems may differ, many of the circumstances of error and the lessons that emerge from investigations apply in any country. Worldwide, people are trying to find ways of making health care safer and less damaging to patients.

This journal has changed too. Changes in the content have reflected developments in quality and safety enterprise that looked very medical and, despite early editorial intentions, was of particular interest to people working within the United Kingdom National Health Service (NHS). Richard Grol, viewing the journal from the other side of North Sea, was able to show the editorial team just how British we were, and just how difficult it was for others to glean generalisable messages from papers that assumed a working knowledge of the NHS. Unless we changed, he said, we would attract neither readers nor authors from outside the United Kingdom. Now all authors are asked to include relevant aspects of their healthcare systems to enable their work to be accessible to readers from other countries. A little extra work for authors perhaps, but it should widen the impact of their work. Richard has served the journal well for many years and his suggested series, Quality improvement research, will be published in a book later this year.

One early assumption was that the safety of care was integral to good quality care. This is a crucial subject: if all healthcare systems were safer, lives would be saved. But, despite a focused issue on clinical risk management and a few other papers, it was not clear either to authors or readers that QHC was interested in papers on the safety of care. Paul Barach had the inspiration to put the “S” into QHC. Since then many more papers on a wide range of topics relevant to safety improvement have been published. Paul has contributed hugely to the journal but has decided to step down from his active editorial role in order to devote more time to his new and demanding role as Director of the Miami Center for Patient Safety.

Many thanks to Richard and Paul for their important contributions and for stimulating change.

The editorial team can influence the content of a journal by commissioning papers. But as a peer reviewed journal we are dependant, too, on submitted papers. So, the content will reflect the range of topics covered by submitted papers.

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The world is now much more knowledgeable about the quality and safety of health care. It is not clear that it is yet any wiser. Many people are working to improve care and some of the lessons they are learning may be of use to others. Tell us about your experiences. If you don’t have the time, inclination, or energy to write a quality improvement report then respond through the new “Quality Ideas” button and post your ideas on the web (http://www.qshc.com/misc/ideas.shtml). Web based publishing has changed journals. Already readers can now contribute their views on published papers in real time and enter debates on the web. Much more interaction is likely in the future. We have set it up! So, be part of this change and let us know what you think.

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Quality improvement reports

A new structure for quality improvement reports

F Moss, R Thomson

Finding out about how others’ schemes to implement change succeed or why they fail can be extremely helpful. It can save time and effort and may accelerate improvements in service delivery. One of the stated aims of this journal is to publish such quality improvement reports along-side papers that report the results of relevant research. The editorial team are aware through discussion with colleagues, from papers presented at meetings, and reading local reports that many people are involved in useful and informative quality improvement projects that could have valuable messages for others. And yet in the past seven and a half years we have only published 12 quality improvement reports—the most recent one in December 1995.

We rely on submitted reports, and one of the reasons for this dearth of published quality improvement reports may be that people are simply too busy improving care to have time to write. But there may be other barriers. The standard form for writing papers in medical journals is the scientific IMRAD (introduction, methods, results, and discussion) structure. This is a convenient and helpful structure for writing about research. When writing a quality improvement report this structure does not quite fit, however. For example, there will be a first methods section—when the measurements are made—and a first results section—when the results are analysed. However, there follows a second methods section describing the implementation of change, perhaps followed by a third methods section when the measurements are repeated to assess progress, and then a second results section describing the improvements. Writing quality improvement reports in this way may not only be difficult but may result in a paper that does not convey the lessons that others would find useful. The editorial team has therefore developed a new structure (box) for describing quality improvement work that we think will reflect this work more accurately and which we hope will encourage authors to write about their experience. A quality improvement report using this structure is republished in this issue.

This is a reprint from the June 1999 issue of *QHC* (Moss F, Thomson R. A new structure for quality improvement reports. *Qual Health Care* 1999;8:76).
There is also another fundamental difference between quality improvement reports and the reports of original research. Research seeks broadly to produce generalisable results. Thus, trials of thrombolytic treatment in acute myocardial infarction sought to determine whether trombolysis reduced subsequent mortality, such that the results could be generalised to coronary care units and medical wards treating such patients. On the other hand, a local audit or quality improvement project, which seeks to assess whether patients are appropriately treated with thrombolytic therapy does so to monitor and ensure the implementation of evidence-based treatment in practice. The results of such a study are not generalisable to other coronary care units in the same way as the preceding research evidence, and for many this would suggest that the work is not publishable. We would disagree. The results may not be generalisable, they are unique to the unit where the audit was undertaken—and most probably to the time of the audit. Any unidentified problem needs local diagnosis and local change to occur to create improvement. But a well-written and structured quality improvement report may include generalisable methods and strategies for change from which others undertaking similar audits would benefit. Thus, good quality improvement reports should include a reflection on the cause of deficiencies in care. Problems associated with implementing change should not be glossed over but described, and possible causes and solutions discussed.

We hope that the new structure will encourage those with practical experience of quality improvement to write about it in a way that will help others. And we hope that readers will find the new quality improvement reports interesting and useful—please let us know.


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