Assessment of complex sociotechnical systems – Theoretical issues concerning the use of organizational culture and organizational core task concepts
Introduction
Assuring the safety and effectiveness of a complex industrial organization is demanding. Most safety management systems and theories of safety critical organizations emphasize the regular self-assessment and auditing of the activities. Rasmussen (1997, p. 183) notes that in spite of all the efforts to design safer systems, severe, large scale accidents still happen. He questions whether safety research has adequate models of accident causation (see also Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000, Dekker, 2005). We argue that many theories of accidents and safety in industrial organizations are based on a static and rational model of an organization or they are non-contextual. They are thus reactive in their search for individual human errors and analysis of previous accidents and incidents, or they are disconnected from the actual work in the organization by their focus on general safety attitudes and values. At the same time, organization research has begun to increasingly emphasize the dynamic and interpretative aspects of organizations. Safety management approaches based on this interpretative view of the organization are still rare. We can thus raise the question of whether safety research has adequate models of complex industrial organizations. This article illustrates two concepts that can be used in understanding and assessing complex industrial organizations, namely the concepts of organizational core task and organizational culture. The aim of this article is to study organizational assessment and more specifically, the significance of organizational culture in assessing the safety and effectiveness of modern industrial organizations.
Industrial organizations of modern society are complex and dynamic sociotechnical systems (Rasmussen, 1997, Leveson, 2004; cf. Perrow, 1984). This is due to the following reasons. In addition to multiple goals (efficiency, safety, credibility, and employee wellbeing), multiple interacting parties (different technical disciplines, various tasks, outside contractors) and complex social structures, they encompass uncertainties in the tightly-coupled and complex technology and the environment (market pressures, political decisions, [de]regulation). The work itself is usually highly specialized, mediated via various tools and information systems, and potentially hazardous (to personnel and/or the environment) (Vicente, 1999, pp. 14–17; see also Perrow, 1984, Rasmussen, 1997, Kirwan, 2001, Orton and Weick, 1990).
Complex sociotechnical systems are uniquely dynamic and constantly changing and adapting. The premises of daily activity and strategic control and steering of these organizations are based on partly implicit norms, values and conceptions. The hierarchy as a control mechanism is undermined by an increasingly horizontal distribution of expertise (Barley, 1996, p. 437). Work in these organizations is becoming increasingly difficult to label as blue collar or white collar, or to dichotomise into mental versus manual labour (cf. Barley, 1996, Oedewald and Reiman, 2003). The complexities of the technology and the physical phenomena on which the work focuses (nuclear reaction, chemistry, etc.) require more and more abstract understanding. Furthermore, the tools themselves have become more complex and abstract (e.g. more computer systems and less hands-on-work, cf. Zuboff, 1988). The work requires specialization into some content areas, but at the same time the understanding of the entire system and the expertise of others becomes more difficult.
The difficulties of managing these complex sociotechnical systems have received a lot of attention in connection with various organizational accidents (e.g. the Challenger space shuttle accident, see Vaughan, 1996, Chernobyl nuclear accident or the Piper Alpha offshore platform accident, see Wright, 1994, Paté-Cornell, 1993). In Turner’s (1978) terms these events have been disasters. This means that the accidents have brought the previous approaches and assumptions about safety into question. A disaster is something that was not supposed to take place according to the existing framework of thinking, but it happened nevertheless. The event was thus in contradiction to the cultural conceptions about safety and the appropriate means for guaranteeing it (Turner, 1978, Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). These “false” conceptions had been gradually rooted in the culture of the organization as it was carrying on with its daily practices. These conceptions should thus be studied and their contribution to organizational effectiveness and safety should be assessed in advance. This should be done before or during the incubation period (Turner, 1978), when the preconditions of the accident are created. We argue that when the complexity of the work, technology and the social environment are increased, the significance of the most implicit features of organizational culture as a means of coordinating the work and achieving the safety and effectiveness of the activities also increases (cf. Perrow, 1986, Weick, 1987, Weick, 1995, Dekker, 2005).
The aim of this article is to study organizational assessment in complex sociotechnical systems. Based on the above, we acknowledge the practical need to monitor, anticipate and manage the safety and effectiveness of the sociotechnical systems. This article builds on and elaborates four statements: (1) the current models of safety management are largely based on a rational or a non-contextual image of an organization, (2) complex sociotechnical systems are socially constructed and dynamic cultures, (3) in order to be able to assess complex sociotechnical systems an understanding of the organizational core task is required, and (4) effectiveness and safety depend on the cultural conceptions of the organizational core task. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the proposed concepts for organizational research and development work in complex sociotechnical systems.
Section snippets
Statement 1: current models of safety management are based on a rational or a non-contextual image of an organization
In this section we argue that most current models of safety management are based on a rational or a non-contextual image of an organization. They thus originate from a “traditional” mechanistic paradigm of organization science (Waring, 1996, Dekker, 2005). This paradigm emphasizes the rationality and instrumentality of organizations. Organizations are considered as mechanistic. They are “set up to accomplish a specific task and to advance quite precise objectives, and they have a formalised
Procedure for organizational assessment utilizing the concepts of OCT and organizational culture
A methodology called Contextual Assessment of Organizational Culture (CAOC) has been developed around the principles depicted in this article. The methodology has been applied in e.g. nuclear power plant maintenance units (Oedewald and Reiman, 2003, Reiman et al., 2005, Reiman and Oedewald, in press), regulatory authority (Reiman and Norros, 2002), metal manufacturing, NPP engineering organization and hospital settings. The cultural assessment consists of three phases (Fig. 3):
- 1.
Characterizing
Conclusions
The aim of this article was to study organizational assessment in complex sociotechnical systems. We introduced the concept of organizational core task (OCT). We proposed that together with a dynamic view of the complex sociotechnical system as an organizational culture, OCT can be used in assessing the central features of a particular culture. We then discussed the implications of the concepts for behavioural scientific research and development work at complex sociotechnical systems.
In order
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