Error-free environments do not exist | Design of systems to absorb errors through redundancy, standardisation and checklists |
In most cases, errors do not result from negligence or discipline related problems but from faulty system design. “Pilot error is not all pilot” | Movement from placing blame to designing safe processes and procedures, i.e. applying a systems approach |
Mishap reporting is aimed to encourage open and full reporting | Assurance of full immunity while implementing a non-punitive approach |
Adverse event definition is a leading factor in organisational learning: major accidents are viewed as the “tip of the iceberg” | Debriefing of all events, including near misses, that have learning potential. Focus on the severity of the potential risk rather than on the severity of the event’s final outcome is more conducive to establishing effective prevention programmes |
The prevention of accidents is a long term ongoing process rather than an episodic effort | Institutionalisation of a permanent programme for risk identification, analysis, and dissemination of the lessons learnt throughout the professional community |