Debias the environment instead of the judge: an alternative approach to reducing error in diagnostic (and other) judgment
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Chronological cues and consumers’ preference for mere newness
2022, Journal of RetailingCitation Excerpt :Overgeneralization is a natural part of learning and has been used to explain a wide range of phenomena such as stereotyping (Le Pelley et al. 2010), facial judgments (Zebrowitz and Rhodes 2004), and cooperation in social dilemmas (Baron 1997). Additionally, evolutionary-rooted tendencies are not sensitive to specific situations (Hsee et al. 2014) and may translate to a preference for merely newer things, i.e., an overgeneralization (Hsee et al. 2013; Arkes and Ayton 1999; Klayman and Brown 1993). Consumers may thus fail to distinguish situations in which newness is relevant or not, overgeneralizing from situations where newness is functional (e.g., fruit) to non-functional consumption settings (e.g., office stationary).
Relevance insensitivity: A new look at some old biases
2019, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision ProcessesCitation Excerpt :In this research, we argue that people overgeneralize their responses in situations in which a particular type of information is on average intermediately relevant to situations in which that information is irrelevant or highly relevant. Relevance insensitivity also builds on the idea that people are largely adapted to their environments, but are not perfectly attuned to every situation they encounter (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; Hogarth, 1981; Hsee, Zhang, Cai, & Zhang, 2013; Klayman & Brown, 1993; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). If people are insensitive to a certain situational variable, then they may exhibit one bias when encountering one end of the variable, and a reverse bias when encountering the other end.
Choosing one at a time? Presenting options simultaneously helps people make more optimal decisions than presenting options sequentially
2017, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision ProcessesCitation Excerpt :After viewing details of various options presented together rather than one at a time, people acquire a better understanding of the differences among the options (Goldstone, 1996; McKenzie, 1998). For example, compared to participants who learned about both common and unique symptoms of two illnesses sequentially, participants who were presented with the symptoms of both illnesses simultaneously were more likely to use diagnostic symptoms in a subsequent diagnosis task (Klayman & Brown, 1993). Similarly, viewing simultaneously presented options helps people realize the weaknesses of individual options.
Learning from experience in nonlinear environments: Evidence from a competition scenario
2015, Cognitive PsychologyCitation Excerpt :Most participants’ judgments could be well described by linear models but some nonlinear processing was also evident in the decision aid condition. When judgmental strategies fail to match task demands alternative corrective procedures can be implemented (Klayman & Brown, 1993). As illustrated in Experiments 1 and 2, one way is to provide different types of feedback or specific decision aids.
Nudges that should fail?
2020, Behavioural Public Policy
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We thank Jackie Gnepp, Arthur Elstein, Michael Doherty, Craig McKenzie, F.R. Heath, Linda Ginzel, Selwyn Becker, Robin Hogarth, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.